Before the World Cup began, Sports Illustrated (along with many other publications) featured cover stories on the tournament, highlighting the stars of the United States. Chosen for the main cover picture were four of the team’s biggest names. Three were forwards, representing the disproportionate star power the team was fielding upfront. Yet in the end, the U.S. won its third World Cup because it chose to bench four of its five forwards.

Wait, what? 

Rejecting the obligatory inclusion of “stars” simply for the sake of it was one of the boldest moves in recent U.S. team history.

On the surface, it’s counterintuitive, as the American team became more dynamic on offense because it played only one forward instead of two (or three). While forwards Sydney Leroux, Christen Press and Amy Rodriguez all played meaningful minutes in the tournament, their eventual benching was a bravely astute choice in the final two games of the World Cup run.

And while Abby Wambach still featured as a sub, her exclusion from the starting lineup in the quarterfinals (and every game after that) was also correct, vindicated by the team’s dominance against the world’s best.

Shifting the team’s formation mid-tournament was a gamble from U.S. coach Jill Ellis, but it made all the difference. Rejecting the obligatory inclusion of “stars” simply for the sake of it was one of the boldest moves in recent U.S. team history, though the reward is self evident.

And like the other two World Cup winning teams of 1991 and 1999, the 2015 edition conquered the world by opting to be different.

The problem

Even before the start of the World Cup, the U.S. had a clearcut lineup issue. Arranged in a standard 4-4-2 formation (with two distinct forwards in the game), it appeared to be the most logical choice. After all, that was the eventual formation used in the victory of the 2012 Olympics, as well as the end of the 2011 World Cup run. It allowed Ellis to harness at least two of the team’s five forwards, with substitutions providing a chance to unleash further reinforcements.

In reality, the lineup was completely out of sync, leaving an uncertain American defense vulnerable. It was a reactive team setup, since it was based purely on trying to jam as many of the team’s stars into the lineup as was safely possible.

The heart of the problem came in the midfield, where U.S. talent was being wasted. Both central midfielders, Carli Lloyd and Lauren Holiday, were used to playing in an attacking role. In the 4-4-2 though, they were forced into unnatural defensive responsibilities. Both players’ instincts drove them forward into the attack, but this left a whole in the middle of the field:

In the opening group games of the tournament, especially  the first game against Australia, the Americans looked particularly underwhelming on offense and susceptible to surrendering chances on defense through the center of the midfield.

Notice the gap here, where the Australian player on the lower right (wearing the dark jersey) is easily able to slip into the open space between the American midfield and defense:

Of course, the United States still managed to survive the group stage, due to the team’s superior individual talent. Megan Rapinoe single-handedly lifted the Americans to victory against Australia, with Hope Solo stopping multiple shots that would have been goals against virtually any other keeper in the tournament.

Yet the problem remained, looming as an ominous threat for the inevitably stiffer challenges in the knockout rounds.

The fix

Despite shunning the discussion of tactics to the press, Ellis was certainly aware of her team’s deficiency. Fixing the problem was another matter though. After all, her predecessor as U.S. coach, Tom Sermanni, had been fired in 2014 for trying to change how the Americans played (which the team essentially rejected).

Ellis clearly realized that any change would be heavily scrutinized, resisting to alter the formation even into the knockout round’s first game (against Colombia). Again, the U.S. won, but looked far from being the tournament’s most dynamic team. Only after being forced to alter the lineup in the quarterfinals (due to yellow card suspensions of Holiday and Rapinoe) did Ellis feel comfortable showcasing something new.

Forced to insert another central midfielder due to Holiday’s absence, Ellis turned to Morgan Brian, the 22-year old who was the youngest player on the roster. Deployed specifically as a “holding midfielder” (a player whose specific task is to sit directly in front of the defense), Brian immediately made the already formidable American defense rock solid against China in the quarterfinals:

And in both the semifinal against Germany and the final against Japan, it all clicked. With Brian sitting deep, she not only allowed a more fluid passing setup, but also blocked the previously open space between the U.S. midfield and defense. The problem was solved.

The result

The final two games of the World Cup showcased the United States at its best. In a 4-2-3-1 (utilizing five midfielders but only one striker), Ellis had found the best balance between attack and defense, athleticism and technique, natural aggression and tactical awareness.

The final iteration of the U.S. lineup arrived at a striking conclusion: The team was at its best when playing only one of the star forwards. Alex Morgan, who began the World Cup with a lingering injury, played her role to perfection. And with Brian inserted into a midfield of five, there was proper cover for both Lloyd and Holiday to attack:

Tellingly, it was the American midfield that did the majority of the goal-scoring in the end. Throughout the tournament, only two of the team’s goals were actually scored by forwards (Morgan and Wambach notching one apiece), with Christen Press’s single goal coming while she was also technically a midfielder.

In the final, the normally prolific passing Japanese were completely swamped. In 15 electric minutes to begin the game, the U.S. looked utterly unassailable, controlling possession for more than 70 percent of the opening few minutes. Two masterful set-piece goals were followed by a quintessential forward run and finish from Holiday:

Had Ellis not made the formation change, it’s very likely that Holiday would never have made that run (since she would’ve been concerned with not overcommitting).

The U.S. switch to five midfielders paid off. Lloyd, free from her former defensive obligations, was obviously the game’s star, becoming the first woman to ever score a hat trick in a World Cup final. She stormed around the field in an attacking role, terrorizing Japanese defenders at will:

Tobin Heath’s second half goal confirmed what was already the reality: American victory was forged not by their star forwards, but by their midfield, which proved as clinical as it was industrious:

The 4-2-3-1 formation was the latest lineup evolution from a victorious U.S. World Cup team. In 1991, American coach Anson Dorrance famously opted for 3-4-3 instead of a conventional setup. And even in 1999, blessed with enormous talent, it was still Tony DiCicco’s decision to move to a 4-3-3 that put the team at its best.

Tactical discussion can be overblown in modern soccer analysis. Yet there has rarely been a more stark example of tactical innovation than the 2015 USA women. From start to finish of the World Cup, they evolved, peaking at the perfect time and giving the world a true glimpse at the beautiful game.

The 5-2 win in the final was a masterclass performance. And the most impressive aspect of it was that it was achieved through bold measure. Ellis refuted the notion that she somehow was obligated to play her stars, regardless of what it meant for the team’s dynamic. She dared to go in the other direction, enabling the United States not only win the World Cup, but do it in emphatic style.

The bold choice of not starting all but one of the star forwards led directly to victory.
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